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Assessing Behavior in Context
Do Physicians Always Flee from
HMOs? New Results Using Dynamic
Panel Estimation Methods
Timothy T. Brown, Janet M. Coffman, Brian C. Quinn, Richard
M. Scheffler, and Douglas D. Schwalm
Objective. To assess the impact of changes in relative health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO) penetration on changes in the physician-to-population ratio in California
counties when changes in the economic conditions in California counties relative to the
U.S. average are taken into account.
Data Sources. Data on physicians who practiced in California at any time from 1988
to 1998 were obtained from the AMA Masterfile. The analysis was restricted to active,
patient care physicians, excluding medical residents. Data on other covariates in the
model were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, InterStudy, the Area
Resource File, and the California state government. Data were merged using county
FIPS codes.
Study Design. Changes in the physician-to-population ratio in California counties
include the effects of both intrastate migration and interstate migration. A reduced-form
model was estimated using the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel estimator. Economic
conditions in California relative to the U.S. were measured as the ratio of county-level
real per capita income to national-level real per capita income. Relative HMO pen-
etration in California was measured as the ratio of county-level HMO penetration to
HMO penetration in the U.S. relative HMO penetration was instrumented using five
identifying variables to address potential endogeneity. Omitted-variable bias was con-
trolled for by first differencing the model. The model also incorporated eight other
covariates that may be associated with the demand for physicians: the percentage of the
population enrolled in Medicaid, beds in short-term hospitals per 100,000 population,
the percentage of the population that is black, the percentage of the population that is
Hispanic, the percentage of the population that is Asian, the percentage of the pop-
ulation that is below age 18, the percentage of the population that is aged 65 and older,
and the percentage of the population that are new legal immigrants in a given year. All of
the above variables were lagged one period. The lagged physician-to-population ratio
was also included to control for the supply of physicians. Separate equations were
estimated for primary care physicians and specialist physicians.
Principal Findings. Changes in lagged relative HMO penetration are negatively as-
sociated with changes in specialist physicians per 100,000 population. However, this
effect of HMO penetration is attenuated and at times reversed in areas where the
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magnitude of the difference in relative economic conditions is sufficiently large. We did
not find any statistically significant effects for primary care physicians.
Conclusions. Consistent with prior studies, we find that changes in physician supply
are associated with changes in relative HMO penetration. Relative economic conditions
are an important moderator of the effect of changes in relative HMO penetration on
physician migration.
Key Words. Managed care organizations (e.g., HMOs/PPOs/IPAs), health work-
force: distribution/incomes/training, econometrics
Physicians, like any other professional group, tend to locate in those areas in
which they will maximize their incomes, other things equal. Previous studies
have found that managed care reduces the earnings of physicians, particularly
specialist physicians, by reducing the demand for specialist care both abso-
lutely and relative to generalist care (Simon, Dranove, and White 1997, 1998;
Hadley and Mitchell 1999, 2002).1 Several studies that analyzed data from the
late 1980s and early 1990s suggest that specialists have responded to these
incentives. The studies found that the number of specialists grew more rapidly
in areas in which a relatively low percentage of the population was enrolled in
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (Escarce et al. 2000; Polsky et al.
2000; Jiang and Begun 2002).
However, none of these studies focused on an important determinant of
physician migration: relative economic conditions. We show that including a
measure of these conditions gives important additional information about how
physicians respond to changes in HMO penetration.
We present evidence consistent with previous research that shows, other
things equal, that there is a negative relationship between changes in relative
HMO penetration and changes in the specialist physician-to-population ratio.
However, this relationship can be attenuated and even reversed in areas
where relative economic conditions are sufficiently favorable. We did not find
statistically significant effects for primary care physicians.
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We start with a discussion of prior research, and then develop our con-
ceptual framework, after which we present our empirical model, estimation
method, and data sources. After showing the results of our analyses, we end
with a discussion of the results, including their implications for health policy.
PRIOR STUDIES
Three previous studies have examined the impact of changes in HMO pen-
etration on changes in physician stock (Simon, Dranove, and White 1997;
Escarce et al. 2000; Jiang and Begun 2002). Simon, Dranove, and White (1997)
found that from 1985 to 1993, the numbers of anesthesiologists, pathologists,
and radiologists grew less rapidly in states where physicians derived a rela-
tively high percentage of revenue from managed care organizations. Jiang and
Begun (2002) reported that the change in HMO penetration in metropolitan
areas between 1985 and 1994 was positively associated with the change in the
percentage of primary care physicians and negatively associated with the
change in the percentage of surgical specialists. Escarce et al. (2000) found that
metropolitan areas that experienced high rates of growth in HMO penetration
from 1986 to 1996 experienced larger increases in the percentage of physi-
cians who were generalists and smaller increases in the total number of phy-
sicians and in the number of medical/surgical specialists. Escarce and
colleagues’ findings are especially persuasive because they use instrumental
variables to adjust for the potential endogeneity of HMO penetration and
changes in the number of physicians.
Although previous studies of the impact of growth in HMO penetration
on physician stock are highly informative, they have important methodolog-
ical limitations. Prior studies used two periods of data separated in time by 8–
10 years in order to detect long-run trends in physician stock. This approach
will accurately detect long-run movements of physicians, but cannot detect
changes in the behavior of physicians that may occur in the shorter run be-
tween the endpoints used. The detection of shorter-run changes in physician
stock requires data from multiple time periods and alternative methodologies,
both of which we employ in this study.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual frameworks used by Escarce et al. (2000) and Simon, Dra-
nove, and White (1997) assume that HMOs attempt to contain health care
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costs by tightly controlling the utilization of specialists while simultaneously
providing generous coverage for primary care and preventive services. Tech-
niques for controlling the use of specialists include prior authorization, refer-
rals, utilization management, and practice guidelines. This strategy reduces
demand for specialists and increases demand for primary care physicians
among HMO enrollees. In markets with high rates of relative HMO pene-
tration, these changes in demand are expected to foster a decrease in special-
ists’ incomes and either an increase or no change in primary care physicians’
incomes. On the margin, specialists are expected to respond to a decrease in
income by retiring, switching from patient care to nonpatient care activities, or
relocating to markets with lower rates of HMO penetration, ceteris paribus.
On the margin, primary care physicians are expected to respond to an in-
crease in income by relocating to markets with relatively higher rates of HMO
penetration or to not move at all, ceteris paribus.
The extent to which these inferences regarding physician behavior per-
sist over time depends on a major assumption: the stability of relative eco-
nomic conditions over time. Changes in relative economic conditions can
affect the demand for medical services. The demand for medical services is
likely to increase in areas experiencing relatively stronger economic growth,
creating opportunities for physicians to enter such areas, ceteris paribus.
While the independent effects on net physician migration of local chang-
es in relative HMO penetration and changes in relative economic conditions
are theoretically unambiguous, the effect on net physician migration for areas
where changes in both relative HMO penetration and relative economic con-
ditions are occurring (the interaction effect) is theoretically ambiguous. Given
that an area is experiencing growth in relative HMO penetration, relative
economic growth would tend to attenuate the negative effect of growth in
relative HMO penetration on net physician migration out of that area. On other
hand, given that an area is experiencing relative economic growth, increases in
relative HMO penetration would tend to attenuate the positive effect of relative
economic growth on net physician migration into that area. The effects run in
opposite directions. What the sign of the interaction effect is depends on
whether the main effect on net physician migration of increases in relative
HMO penetration or the main effect of relative economic growth is larger.
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND ESTIMATION METHODS
As illustrated above, the economic relationship between changes in the phy-
sician-to-population ratio and changes in relative HMO penetration is likely to
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be dynamic. That is, physicians’ responses to changes in relative HMO pen-
etration and the relative economic environment take time to work themselves
out and we would not expect the responses of physicians to a change in HMO
penetration or the relative economic environment to be completed in a single
year. Current mobility will be a function of past mobility. A dynamic panel
model allows us to determine how long it takes for adjustments to occur.
Studies have recently used dynamic panel models to examine both physician
labor supply (Baltagi, Bratberg, and Holmas 2005) and nurse staffing (Mark
et al. 2004). Our model is described as follows:
The equilibrium stock of physicians can be described by
Y it ¼ H itb1 þM itb2 þ eit ð1Þ
where the equilibrium physician-to-population ratio in county i at time t is
represented by Y it . Changes in this ratio include the net effect of changes from
any of the three following causes: physicians moving within California, phy-
sicians leaving California, and physicians entering California. Physicians
make their decision in terms of moving within, out of, or into California based,
in part, on relative HMO penetration. Hit is thus measured by the ratio of
county-level HMO penetration to U.S. HMO penetration. Mit is a 1  k vec-
tor of covariates that may affect the demand for medical care including the
percentage of the population enrolled in Medicaid (Medi-Cal in California),
the number of short-term general hospital beds per 100,000 population, the
percentage of the population that is black, the percentage of the population
that is Hispanic, the percentage of the population that is Asian, the percentage
of the population that is below age 18, the percentage of the population that is
aged 65 and older, and the percentage of the population that are new legal
immigrants in a given year. The error term is represented as eit. An important
fact to note is that during 1988–1998 a significant number of hospitals closed
resulting in a 12 percent decrease in the number of short-term general hospital
beds nationally (Lindrooth, Lo Sasso, and Bazzoli 2003).
We then add a simple partial-adjustment mechanism as shown below:
Y it  Y iðt1Þ ¼ lðY it  Y iðt1ÞÞ; 0 < l < 1 ð2Þ
where Yit indicates the realized physician-to-population ratio. Combining
equations (1) and (2) yields
Y it ¼ Y iðt1Þa1 þ H itb1 þM itb2 þ eit : ð3Þ
To pick up the effect of the relative economic environment in each California
county as compared with the U.S. average we add an additional variable: the
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ratio of real per capita income for a given county to real per capita income for
the U.S. We designate this variable Iit. We interact this variable with Hit. We
also lag all independent variables to rule out potential reverse causation. These
additions are reflected below:
Yit ¼ Yiðt1Þa1 þ Hiðt1Þb1 þ Iiðt1Þb2 þ Hiðt1ÞIðt1Þ
 
b3 þMðt1Þb4
þ eit : ð4Þ
Finally, the model is first differenced in order to control for omitted variable
bias, which yields
DYit ¼ DYiðt1Þa1 þ DHiðt1Þb1 þ DIiðt1Þb2 þ D Hiðt1ÞIðt1Þ
 
b3
þ DMðt1Þb4 þ Deit : ð5Þ
First differencing is indicated by D. Market areas are likely to have unmeas-
ured characteristics including those that may affect the quality of life in each
area. Exclusion of area-specific characteristics may lead to omitted variable
bias because these characteristics are likely to be correlated with the explan-
atory variables. First differencing controls for area-specific heterogeneity by
including the equivalent of area-level fixed effects.
The first lag of relative HMO penetration, Hiðt1Þ, is a predetermined
variable (a variable which would be endogenous if it were not lagged). Pre-
determined variables are exogenous to current behavior. However, when first
differenced it DHiðt1Þ
 
becomes endogenous. A similar problem affects the
lagged dependent variable. This problem is addressed using the generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator designed by Arellano and Bond (A–B)
(1991).2
In the initial version of the A–B model (Arellano and Bond 1991), first
differences of predetermined and endogenous variables are instrumented with
lags of their own levels. However, lagged levels are often poor instruments for
first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) explain that this problem is al-
leviated if the original equation in levels is added to the system estimation of
the equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) present a full explanation of this
system version of the A–B model. Our estimates employ this approach.
In our implementation of the A–B model, we also include a vector of five
exogenous variables in our instrument matrix that are not included as inde-
pendent variables in the main model to instrument for the potential end-
ogeneity of lagged changes in relative HMO penetration. These five
identifying variables are similar to those used by Escarce et al. (2000) in
two-stage least-squares models and include the percentages of employees in
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construction and manufacturing and the proportion of firms with 100–249,
259–499, and 500 or more employees. We test for their exogeneity using
Hansen’s J test, which is robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We
also estimate robust standard errors using the two-step version of the
Arellano–Bond system estimator with a finite-sample correction (Windmeijer
2000). The one-step version of the Arellano–Bond system estimator is esti-
mated as well and also provides robust standard errors.3 In both cases, es-
timated standard errors are robust to any pattern of heteroscedasticity or
autocorrelation.
A critical point is that equation (5) is not identified if the dependent
variable is persistent (if the dependent variable has a long memory). We test
the dependent variable for the existence of a unit root using the panel unit root
test developed by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002). The null hypothesis is that the
dependent variable is nonstationary. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can
rule out persistence, because shocks to a stationary variable are not persistent.
Additionally, the system A–B estimator incorporates the strong assump-
tion that lagged values of the dependent variable and the error terms are
uncorrelated. We examine the appropriateness of this assumption by testing
for the presence of second-, third-, and fourth-order autocorrelation. First-
order autocorrelation is expected and does not signify an improper model
specification.
Our units of analysis are the numbers of primary care and specialist
physicians per 100,000 population in a county. Counties are used as proxies
for market areas for several reasons. First, we could not use metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) because our analysis incorporates nonmetropolitan as
well as metropolitan areas. Second, in many cases the values for MSAs and
counties are identical, because most MSAs in California contain only one
county. Third, we could not perform subcounty level analyses because our
physician data do not permit us to distinguish office addresses from home
addresses. Use of home addresses may lead to errors, particularly in large
counties in which many workers commute from one part of the county to
another. All analyses were conducted using Stata 8.2.
DATA
We obtained annual data on the numbers of all full-time equivalent (FTE)
physicians in California during the period from 1988 to 1998 from the AMA
Masterfile.4 This database contains current and historical data on physicians’
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demographic characteristics, professional characteristics, and practice loca-
tion. We limit our analysis to physicians who reported that their major pro-
fessional activity was patient care, because we hypothesized that physicians
who derive most of their income from patient care would be more sensitive to
changes in relative HMO penetration than physicians engaged primarily in
nonpatient care activities. In addition, we restrict our analysis to physicians
who had completed graduate medical education because many residents re-
locate once they complete their training irrespective of changes in local rel-
ative HMO penetration.
Physicians who reported only one specialty are counted as 1.0 FTE in
the reported specialty. Physicians who reported two specialties are counted as
0.6 FTE in their primary specialty and 0.4 FTE in their secondary specialty.
This method has been used in previous studies of the impact of HMO pen-
etration on physicians (Newhouse et al. 1982; Escarce et al. 2000). Total phy-
sicians per county are divided by the population (in 100,000s) in each county
to adjust for variation in county population.
Primary care physicians are defined as physicians who specialize in
family practice, general internal medicine, general pediatrics, obstetrics/gyn-
ecology, or general practice. Specialists include anesthesiologists, emergency
physicians, pathologists, radiologists, internal medicine subspecialists, pe-
diatric subspecialists, dermatologists, neurologists, occupational medicine
physicians, psychiatrists, rehabilitation physicians, general surgeons, and sur-
gical subspecialists. Table 1 presents state-level physician-to-population ratios
over time.
County-level estimates of HMO penetration in California’s 58 counties
were obtained from Douglas Wholey.5 These estimates are preferable to un-
adjusted estimates reported by InterStudy, because they correct for errors in
reporting HMO enrollment. For the years examined, InterStudy attributes all
enrollment to the county in which a HMO is headquartered. Wholey uses an
algorithm to annually apportion HMO enrollees across all counties in a
Table 1: Physicians per 100,000 Population in California: 1988–1998
Type of Physician
Year
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Specialists 110.17 107.67 111.15 111.65 111.48 111.74
Primary care 78.95 78.78 82.03 81.15 81.98 83.29
Source: AMA Masterfile.
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HMO’s service area based on county population for the year in question
(Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson 1995). Wholey includes only commer-
cial HMOs (including Medicaid and Medicare enrollment in these HMOs),
but excludes Medicaid-only HMOs in order to focus on commercial HMOs
and maintain consistency of the data through time. Table 2 presents state-level
and national HMO penetration over time.
Data on other covariates in the model were obtained from the Area
Resource File, the California state government, and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. We used these data to construct the following variables: the ratio of
county-level real per capita income to real per capita income in the U.S., the
percentage of the population enrolled in Medicaid (Medi-Cal in California),
hospital beds in short-term hospital per 100,000 population, the percentage of
the population that is black, the percentage of the population that is Hispanic,
the percentage of the population that is Asian, the percentage of the popu-
lation that is below age 18, the percentage of the population that is aged 65 and
older, and the percentage of the population that are new legal immigrants in a
given year. Data for the exogenous variables in the instrument matrix were
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns.
The means and standard deviations of the variables used are presented
in Table 3. As most of the variables listed in Table 3 are ratios, the most




1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
California
Private commercial 28.0 30.0 28.3 30.7 36.2 38.4
Total commercial (including Medicaid
and Medicare)n
28.0 30.0 31.6 35.3 42.8 47.6
U.S.
Private commercial 13.1 13.9 14.0 15.8 20.1 23.2
Total commercial (including Medicaid
and Medicare)n
13.1 13.9 15.2 17.8 23.5 28.0
Ratio of California to U.S.
Private commercial 2.16 2.16 2.02 1.94 1.80 1.66
Total commercial (including Medicaid
and Medicare)n
2.16 2.16 2.08 1.98 1.82 1.70
Source: InterStudy data as adjusted by Douglas Wholey.
nFor consistency figures are for commercial HMOs only and thus exclude Medicaid-only HMOs.
HMO, health maintenance organization.
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informative information in Table 3 is the standard deviations, which empha-
size the wide range of the medical and economic characteristics of California
counties. The standard deviations for the physician-to-population ratios are
large because of the wide variation in the number of patient care physicians
across California’s counties, which ranges from zero in two sparsely populated
rural counties to over 15,000 in Los Angeles County.
RESULTS
Specification tests of the Arellano–Bond regressions show that the equation is
reasonably specified. We estimated both the one- and two-step versions of the
Arellano–Bond system estimator. We found the results of the two estimators to
Table 3: California County-Level Means and Standard Deviations, 1988–
1998 (n 5 638)
Variables Meann SD
Yit
Total specialists per 100,000 population 79.470 52.442
Total primary care physicians per 100,000 population 69.100 28.726
Hit
California county HMO penetration to U.S. HMO penetration 1.308 1.052
Iit
Real per capita county income in California to real per capita
income in the U.S.
0.931 0.241
Mit
Short-term general hospital beds per 100,000 population 268.969 198.656
Percent population enrolled in Medi-Cal 15.524 6.587
Percent population below age 18 28.044 3.825
Percent population aged 65 and older 12.973 3.683
Percent population black 3.394 3.617
Percent population Hispanic 18.474 13.037
Percent population Asian 5.150 5.749
Percent population that are new legal immigrants
Instrumental variables
Percent employees in construction 5.834 2.784
Percent employees in manufacturing 14.400 7.299
Proportion of firms employing 100–249 0.010 0.005
Proportion of firms employing 250–499 0.003 0.003
Proportion of firms employing 5001 0.001 0.003
nMeans are of county-level ratios which will not be equal to state-level ratios.
HMO, health maintenance organization.
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be virtually identical, but found the one-step version slightly more efficient in
the present case and so report the one-step results in Table 4.3 The Arellano–
Bond test for autocorrelation in first differences gives the following results. In
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: percent population new legal
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 1.840  0.635
(1.18) (0.23)
F-statistic 4948.54nn 2683.71nn
AR(1) (z-statistic)  4.25nn  3.94nn
AR(2) (z-statistic)  1.02  1.53
AR(3) (z-statistic) 1.62 0.38
AR(4) (z-statistic)  0.62  0.50
Hansen’s J statistic (w2) 52.43 44.41
Levin–Lin–Chu panel unit root test (t-statistic)  3.74nn  16.18nn
Observations 513 513
Number of counties 57 57
Absolute values of z-statistics in parentheses (two-tailed test).
nnSignificant at 1%.
nSignificant at 5%.
HMO, health maintenance organization.
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columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, which show the specialist and primary care
equations, neither second-order autocorrelation (column 1: z 5  1.02,
p 5 .31; column 2: z 5  1.53, p 5 .13), third-order autocorrelation (column
1: z 5 1.62, p 5 .11; column 2: z 5 0.38, p 5 .71), nor fourth-order autocorre-
lation (column 1: z 5  0.62, p 5 .54; column 2: z 5  0.50, p 5 .62) are
present. These results are consistent with the Arellano–Bond model’s as-
sumption of no second-order or higher-order autocorrelation. The results of
Levin, Lin, and Chu’s (2002) panel unit root test indicate that we can reject the
null hypothesis that the dependent variable is nonstationary (specialist:
t 5  3.74, po.01; primary care: t 5  16.18, po .01). In addition, the results
of Hansen’s J test of overidentification (column 1: w2 5 52.43, p 5 .94; column
2: w2 5 44.41, p 5 .99) suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid; that is, we can reasonably conclude that
the instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term. We omitted
one very small rural county (Alpine county) because it was a statistical outlier.
The results show that in the California physician labor market, adjust-
ment times vary considerably, but are generally very slow, as can be seen in
Table 4. For specialist physicians, the parameter of the lagged dependent
variable (D(Yi(t 1)) 5 0.938, z 5 18.64, po.01) suggests that only (column 1:
1 0.938 5 0.062) 6.2 percent of the movement towards equilibrium occurs in
a given year, which means that it will take (1/0.062 5 16.1) 16.1 years for full
adjustment to occur. In other words, the labor market for specialist physicians
is, for practical purposes, in continual disequilibrium because of the continual
changes in relative HMO penetration and other changes in labor market
characteristics. Adjustment times for the primary care physician market are
relatively shorter, but still very long. For primary care physicians the param-
eter of the lagged dependent variable (D(Yi(t 1)) 5 0.849, z 5 12.49, po.01)
suggests that (column 2: 1 0.849 5 0.151) 15.1 percent of the movement
towards equilibrium occurs in a given year, which means that it will only take
(1/0.151 5 6.62) 6.62 years for full adjustment to occur. Thus, specialists re-
spond more slowly than primary care physicians to a given change in market
conditions. This difference in the rate at which the two labor markets adjust is
consistent with the fact that specialists require much larger market areas than
primary care physicians do to sustain a given income.
The findings also show that the negative effect of growth in relative
HMO penetration on physician migration dominates the positive effect of
relative economic growth on physician migration. The parameter on the
change in the ratio of real per capita county-level income to real per capita
U.S. income is statistically insignificant (D(Ii(t 1)) 5 0.774, z 5 0.07, p 5 .95).
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However, the parameter for relative HMO penetration is negative and sta-
tistically significant DðHiðt1ÞÞ ¼ 7:278; z ¼ 1:93; p ¼ :05
 
and the param-
eter of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant
DðHðt1ÞÞIðt1ÞÞ ¼ 8:324; z ¼ 2:20; p < :05
 
. The linear combination of
these two variables at the mean values of the differenced variables
is  0.114 (z 5 2.52, p 5 .01) indicating their average negative effect on spe-
cialist migration. This finding is consistent with our conceptual framework.
We do not find any statistically significant results on these key variables for
primary care physicians, which is also consistent with our conceptual frame-
work.
However, this does not imply that there are no circumstances in which
the relative economic environment cannot dominate the effect of changes in
relative HMO penetration. The above discussion only describes the mean
effect. Different situations will result in different effects on specialist migration.
For example, if the relative economic environment is 50 percent better in a
county relative to the U.S. average, an increase in relative HMO penetration
of 1.0 is associated with the migration of specialists migration into such a
county (column 1: (8.324  1.5) 7.278 5 5.21, z 5 2.50, p 5 .01). This effect
is stronger, the more favorable the relative economic environment is. In fact, it
appears that this reversal occurs whenever the relative economic environment
is favorable by 5 percent or more (column 1: (8.324  1.05) 7.278 5 1.46,
z 5 1.97, p 5 .05).
The signs of the remaining parameters are all reasonable. The effect of
lagged increases in short-term general hospital beds per 100,000 population
is slightly negative and statistically significant DðMiðt1ÞÞ ¼ 0:008;

z ¼ 1:98; p < :05Þ. This is to be expected as there was a consolidation of
the hospital market during this period with many hospitals or hospital services
closing (Lindrooth, Lo Sasso, and Bazzoli 2003; Kirby et al. 2005). From 1988
to 1998 the number of short-term general hospital beds per 100,000 popu-
lation in California declined by 22.4 percent. Thus, while the parameter values
make it appear as if physicians were moving away from areas with lagged
growing numbers of hospital beds, a more plausible explanation is that hos-
pital beds were being reduced in the urban areas that physicians prefer.
The following parameters are not statistically significant, but have pos-
itive signs: the lagged percentage of the population enrolled in Medicaid, the
lagged percentage of the population that is black, the lagged percentage of the
population that is below age 18, and the lagged percentage of the population
that is aged 65 and older. The last three parameters also are not statistically
significant, but have negative signs: the percentage of the population that is
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Hispanic, the percentage of the population that is Asian, and the percentage of
the population that are new legal immigrants in a given year.6
DISCUSSION
Our findings augment the conventional wisdom that growth in relative
HMO penetration has led to a redistribution of physicians away from areas
with high rates of growth in relative HMO penetration. Our results suggest
that the relationship between changes in relative HMO penetration and phy-
sician stock is more complex than previously thought, with differences in the
relative economic environment being important moderators of the effect of
changes in relative HMO penetration. Our use of a dynamic panel estimator
enables us to detect short-run changes that were not assessed in previous
studies.
Further research is needed to determine the impact of changes in relative
HMO penetration and the relative economic environment by physician age.
The number of patient care physicians in California age 40 or younger has
decreased in California counties even though the total number of physicians
has increased. (Results not shown.) The likelihood that changes in relative
HMO penetration and the relative economic environment play a role in be-
havior of young physicians is supported by the findings of both Escarce et al.
(1998) and Polsky et al. (2000).
Escarce et al. (1998) examined physician migration using national data
for the years 1989–1994 on young patient-care physicians. They found that
young generalist physicians were more likely than young specialist physicians
to establish their initial practice in areas with high HMO penetration. They
also found that the probability of locating in an area with high HMO pen-
etration relative to low penetration areas decreased over time for both gen-
eralists and specialists. Whether this was because of decreased opportunities
for both types of physicians in high HMO penetration areas or because of
changing physician preferences regarding working in high HMO penetration
areas (or both) was unclear, but indirect evidence suggested that tightening
labor markets may have been be responsible for the change.
Polsky et al. (2000) extended the results of Escarce et al. (1998) using
national data from 1988 to 1995. They showed that medical/surgical special-
ists who were early in their career and who lived in areas where HMO pen-
etration is growing faster relative to other areas were more likely to move, but
that growth in HMO penetration did not affect other types of physicians or
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mid-career medical/surgical specialists. They also found that physicians who
relocated tended to move to areas with the same or lower HMO penetration.
Our findings are likely to be of interest to policymakers concerned about
issues of physician supply and distribution. While it appears as if HMO pen-
etration does affect physician supply, it does not drive away specialist phy-
sicians in all cases. The business cycle and the relative economic environment
are important factors to consider. As a result, it is important to consider the
possibility that policies made during relatively bad economic times may have
very different effects once the relative economic environment improves. Our
finding also suggests that economic development may be a useful strategy for
improving access to care in underserved areas.
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NOTES
1. An additional study (Waitzman and Scheffler 1992) found that in 1990, internists in
markets with low rates of HMO penetration had fees that were 11.6 percent lower
than fees in markets with no HMO penetration, and that internists in markets with
medium levels of HMO penetration had fees that were 16.9 percent lower. How-
ever, the reductions were much less pronounced in markets with high rates of
HMO penetration. Waitzman and Scheffler’s results are difficult to compare with
those of other studies because their sample does not permit them to disaggregate
general internists from medical subspecialists.
2. Using OLS to estimate dynamic panel models is well known to result in biased and
inconsistent estimates. Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) have developed an es-
timator that addresses the problems that arise with OLS by taking first differences
and instrumenting the lagged dependent variable using either lagged levels or
lagged differences of the dependent variable. This method yields consistent es-
timates but is inefficient because it does not use all the available moment restric-
tions (Arellano and Bond 1991).
3. We estimate our model in Stata 8.2 using the xtabond2 module. In addition to the
five exogenous variable noted in the text which we used as ‘‘IV-style’’ instruments
(each lagged two periods), we specified the use of the third through the eighth lags
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of all of the variables included in the main regression (less interaction terms) as
‘‘GMM-style’’ instruments. To make sure we included all appropriate variables
as instruments, but to avoid biasing our parameters, we used the ‘‘collapse’’ option
and thus only included one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather
than one instrument for each variable, time period, and lag distance. This was done
because as the number of instruments included becomes large relative to sample
size, the parameter estimates will become biased towards feasible GLS. The ratio of
instruments to observations in our model is only 0.16. We used a generalized
inverse to calculate the robust weighting matrix when using two-step estimation.
Two-step results were virtually identical to one-step results, with the one-step re-
sults being slightly more efficient (slightly smaller standard errors for the main
variables of interest, DHiðt1Þ and D Hiðt1ÞIðt1Þ
 
, with both versions finding sta-
tistically significant results for these variables in the specialist equation.
4. The AMA did not collect data for the year 1990. We interpolated the values for
1990 by taking the arithmetic mean of 1989 and 1991.
5. We would like to express our great appreciation to Dr. Douglas Wholey for the
permission to use these data.
6. In the present case our data are not a sample of physicians from California coun-
ties, but the universe. Some argue that in the case where the data being analyzed
are the universe rather than a sample from the universe, computing confidence
intervals in order to determine how likely the parameter of the sample is to ap-
proximate the parameter of the universe is inappropriate (McCloskey 1985; McC-
loskey and Ziliak 1996). In this alternative view, when using a universe rather than
a sample, all of the estimated parameters would be used to determine the results
rather than the statistically significant parameters alone.
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Wholey, D., R. Feldman, and J. Christianson. 1995. ‘‘The Effect of Market Structure on
HMO Premiums.’’ Journal of Health Economics 14 (1): 81–105.
Windmeijer, F. 2000. ‘‘A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear
Two-Step GMM Estimators.’’ Working Paper 00/19, Institute for Fiscal Studies,
London.
Do Physicians Always Flee from HMOs? 373
